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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960
WILLS
Joint and Mutual Wills-Lapse of the Interest of The Third
Party Devisee. In Ruchert v. Boyd,1 the Washington court analyzed
a joint and mutual will and decided that the devise of the survivor's
estate to a third party lapsed when the devisee predeceased the sur-
viving testatrix.
Mr. Ruchert and his wife, Anna, executed a will providing that the
survivor should have a life estate in all of the property of the first to
die, with a remainder over to the husband's nephew. The will also
provided that the residue of the survivor's property would upon the
survivor's death pass to the same nephew. The relevant portions of
the will are as follows:
Third. In event of the prior death of the testator, he gives, devises
and bequeaths to the survivor, Anna Ruchert, all of his property, real,
personal and mixed ... for and during her natural life, with remainder
over to his nephew, Boyd Ruchert.
Sixth. Upon the death of the survivor, the entire estate of the
testator and testatrix shall pass to and vest in Boyd Ruchert, in fee
simple.2
Upon the husband's death, Anna accepted a life estate in her hus-
band's estate which included his half of the community property. The
remainder in the husband's estate was distributed to the nephew. This
nephew predeceased Anna who then revoked the joint and mutual will.
After Anna's death, the nephew's widow brought an action for specific
performance of the nephew's third party beneficiary right under an
alleged oral contract to make and keep in effect mutual wills. The
supreme court assumed without deciding that Anna was legally bound
not to revoke the mutual will after the death of her husband. The
court then stated that the nephew's remainder interest in the husband's
estate vested at the time of the husband's death. It held, however, that
no interest in the survivor's estate vested at the time of the husband's
death. Since the devise of the estate of Anna, the surviving testatrix
prevent a gift over from one charitable purpose to another. 4 ScoTT, TausTs § 401.5
(2d ed. 1956).
28 33 Wn.2d 255, 205 P2d 345 (1949).
29 E.g., in In re Rupprecht's Will, 271 App. Div. 376, 65 N.Y.S2d 909 (1946), afftd,
297 N.Y. 462, 74 N.E.2d 175 (1947), the settlor desired that a home be established for
indigent, orphan Protestants under 16 years of age residing in Genessee County. The
court found a general charitable intent.
1 156 Wash. Dec. 278, 352 P2d 216 (1960).2 Id. at 279, 352 P2d at 217.
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did not take effect until her death, it lapsed when the nephew pre-
deceased her. Thus the revocation of the devise after the nephew's
death was immaterial.
The nephew's widow contended that the anti-lapse statute, RCW
11.12.110, which prevents the operation of the common law rule that
a devise or bequest will lapse if the devisee or legatee predeceases the
testator, should apply in this case. She argued that her husband, the
nephew of Mr. Ruchert, fell within the persons intended to be bene-
fited by the statute. These persons are described by the statute as
"any child, grandchild, or other relatives of the testator" who died
leaving lineal descendants.
Reversing the trial court, the supreme court held that this statute
did not prevent a lapse of Anna's devise because the husband's nephew
was not a relative of the testatrix within the meaning of the statute.
This holding was based on the reasoning in In re Renton's Estate,'
which held that the testator's spouse is not a relative within the mean-
ing of what is now RCW 11.12.110, the anti-lapse statute. The rule
in In re Renton's Estate has been incorporated into this statute.
The holding that the devise of the survivor's estate to a third party
did not become a vested remainder upon the death of the testator who
is first to die is consistent with the majority rule.' The court rejected
the reasoning of a Texas case5 in which it was held that the ultimate
devisee received a vested remainder in the entire community estate at
the time of the death of the first to die. The court thought that the flaw
in the reasoning of the Texas court was that the will was treated as
effecting an inter vivos conveyance of the property of a living person.6
Such a result would be contrary to the basic wills rule that a will does
not take effect until the death of the testator.' However, there is a
possibility that the Chadwick case was under Texas law correctly
applying the doctrine of election! The Texas court mentioned the
doctrine but did not fully articulate its operation. The doctrine of
3 10 Wash. 533, 39 Pac. 145 (1895).
4 In re Lage, 19 F.2d 153 (D.C. Iowa 1927) ; It re Brown's Estate, 101 Kan. 335,
166 Pac. 499 (1917) ; Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932). See also
In re Dunn's Estate, 31 Wn.2d 512, 197 P.2d 606 (1948).
5 Chadwick v. Bristow, 204 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), aff'd, 146 Tex. 481,
208 S.W.2d 888 (1948).
6 156 Wash. Dec. 278, 352 P.2d 216 (1960). The court quoted with emphasis a note
in 46 MIcH. L. REV. 1005 (1948) which pointed out this flaw.
7 Grove v. Payne, 47 Wn.2d 461, 288 P.2d 242 (1955).
8 Under the doctrine of election a devisee cannot assert rights inconsistent with the
will after electing to take under it. Tacoma Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Nadham, 14 Wn.2d
576, 128 P.2d 982 (1947). See also Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 736 (1958), and Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 789 (1958) ; cf. Parr v. Davison, 146 Wash. 354, 262 Pac. 959 (1928).
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election is not applicable in the Ruchert case because there was no
attempt to devise more than was owned.'
The Washington court added a note of confusion by referring to
the third devisee's right as a remainder interest. The confusion in the
court's language may have been caused by the fact that the nephew did
receive a vested remainder in the husband's half of the community
property when the husband died. The denomination of the nephew's
devise under the survivor's half of the mutual will as a remainder is
inconsistent with the words of the will as quoted above. Notice that
only the paragraph disposing of the property of the first to die men-
tions a remainder. The sixth paragraph is the only provision of the
will which concerns the disposition of the property of the survivor. It
says nothing about a remainder.
. A second reason why it was incorrect to refer to the nephew's right
as a remainder is that such an analysis is inconsistent with the implicit
holding that the property right would not vest before the death of the
testator. The effect of this holding was to negate the widow's argument
that Anna's interest in her half of the community estate was only a
life estate. Since Anna's estate was not just a life estate but a fee
simple there could be no remainder after it." There is no indication
of any other intervening estate, after which the interest the nephew
might have received by the will, could have been a remainder. In fact,
the will specifically states that the survivor's estate shall vest in him
in fee simple.
As a third objection to the court's statement it is submitted that the
use of the word "remainder" is inconsistent with the holding of lapse.
Although the word "lapse" has been used in talking about remainders,"
it would appear preferable to reserve this word for application to de-
vises and to use future interest law terms to describe future interests
such as remainders. Thus one would say that a property interest, such
as the nephew's remainder in the husband's estate, which has already
passed by devise is no longer subject to the doctrine of lapse. The
lapse of a devise under the law of wills should not be confused with
the failure to vest of a contingent remainder under the law of future
interests because of the non-satisfaction of a condition precedent. For
example, a testator might devise to A for life, and if B survives A then
to B. B's survival of A is a condition precedent which must be satisfied
before the remainder can vest. If B predeceases the testator, the de-
n l re Cooper's Estate, 32 Wn.2d 444, 202 P.2d 439 (1949).




vise of the remainder would lapse under the law of wills. If B survives
the testator, but predeceases A, the devise would take effect at the
testator's death. However, under the law of future interests, the con-
tingent remainder will not vest because the condition precedent can
never be satisfied.'
The confusion in the court's language is illustrative of the confusion
which generally attends mutual will situations. This confusion results
from the dual nature of mutual wills. Often a mutual will is both a
will and also an implementation of a contract to devise. The will is
controlled by the law of wills which says that wills are ambulatory.
Because of the ambulatory nature of wills, the will can always be
revoked." On the other hand, the contract to devise is governed by
the law of contracts. After the surviving testator has accepted benefits
under the joint and mutual will the contract upon which the will is
based cannot be revoked.'
In the Ruckert case the court assumed that the contract had become
irrevocable. Since it was the contract and not the will which was
irrevocable, 5 the right of the nephew should have been determined by
his status as a donee third party beneficiary under the contract, rather
than by his status as a devisee under the will.' Thus the question is
what is the quantum of his contract right.
Courts have analyzed the contract right in several different ways.
One possible analysis is that the third party beneficiary has only a
right to have the devise appear in the will.' Such a devise is subject
to lapse. A second possibility is that the third party beneficiary has a
contract right to receive the property regardless of whether it was
ever devised to him. Under this analysis the contract itself gives him
a right to the property. The rule of lapse does not apply to contract
rights so the third party beneficiary's right to receive the property
would not lapse.' The third possibility is that he has a contract right
which can not be affected by lapse, but his contract right is personal
and therefore does not descend to his personal representative.
12 Id. § 10.
"3 Grove v. Payne, 47 Wn.2d 461, 288 P.2d 242 (1955).
14 Auger v. Shideler, 23 Wn.2d 505, 161 P.2d 200 (1945); Prince v. Prince, 64
Wash. 552, 117 Pac. 255 (1911).
35 it re Krause's Estate, 173 Wash. 1, 21 P.2d 268 (1933); Doyle v. Fisher, 183
Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924).
16 See SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 91 (1956), for a full development of
this analysis and a collection of the applicable cases.
17 Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932).




In the Ruchert case, the court evidently viewed the contract right
as limited to having a devise appear in the will. It is submitted that
the better approach would be to say that the will is only an unnecessary
implementation of the contract. Such a conclusion follows from the
fact that very often contracts to devise are enforced where there is no
devise to implement the contract.' Indeed, most of the reported cases
have arisen because the promisor did not leave a will consistent with
the contract.
The basic issue of the Ruchert case should have been whether the
third party beneficiary contract right was descendable, not whether
the devise lapsed. The weight of authority appears to be that in the
ordinary contract to devise the right of the promisee is descendable?2 0
However, the Washington court reached a contrary result in Alexander
v. Lewes." It was held that the right of the promisee is personal and
therefore dies with the death of the promisee. The effect of the holding
in the Ruckert case, that the contract right did not descend, appears
to be consistent with this previous holding of non-descendability.
However, the promise to devise in Alexander v. Lewes" was given in
exchange for a promise to support for life. The actual reason for
refusing to allow the promisee's heir to recover was probably that the
testator's duty to devise was discharged by failure of consideration
when the promisee's performance was rendered impossible because she
predeceased the testator. In a third party beneficiary contract to make
mutual wills the performance bargained for is by alternative analysis
either the execution of the mutual wills or a testamentary right to
the property regardless of whether a will is executed. Either way it
is the promisor's performance that is bargained for and performance
by a donee beneficiary should have no effect upon his contract right.2 1
Although it impliedly followed this reasoning, the court may have
been influenced by the fact that the nephew's actual relationship to
the parties bore some similarity to that of the promisee in the Alex-
ander case. At some time before the execution of the mutual will the
'
9 Raab v. Wallerich, 46 Wn. 2d 375, 282 P.2d 271 (1955), appeal dismissed, 46
Wn.2d 905, 290 P2d 697 (1955). See Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 34 WAsH.
L. REv. 467, 503 (1959) for a collection of cases in which enforcement of a promise to
execute a will was either granted or denied.20Cuenin v. Lakin, 146 Cal. App. 2d 855, 304 P.2d 157 (1957) ; Trower v. Young,
40 Cal. App.2d 539, 105 P.2d 160 (1940) ; Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 269 N.W.
883 (1936) ; Torgerson v. Hauge, 34 N.D. 646, 159 N.W. 6 (1916). See also Swingley
v. Daniels, 123 Wash. 409, 212 Pac. 729 (1923) in which an assignee was granted
specific performance.
21 104 Wash. 32, 175 Pac. 572 (1918).
22 Ibid.
2 3 See 2 WnmLsTo, CONMACTS § 395 (rev. ed. 1936).
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nephew entered into a partnership with the testator and testatrix.
Under this partnership agreement, the nephew was to manage the
property in question and pay part of the proceeds to the testator and
testatrix of the survivor thereof. Of course, he could not perform this
duty after he died. Furthermore, there was evidence that he did not
satisfactorily perform while alive.
The oral contract to devise did not indicate the quantum of his
right."4 The only evidence of the quantum of the nephew's contract
right was the language of the will. Under the circumstances it is not
surprising that the court reached its conclusion without an adequate
differentiation and discussion of wills, future interests, and contract
law aspects of the problem.
The contractual analysis of the facts of the Ruchert case which the
court could have used to reach the same result is as follows: The
nephew had a third party beneficiary right under the contract to make
mutual wills. The only evidence of this right was the language of the
joint and mutual will made in pursuance of this contract. Since only
the nephew was named in the will and not his wife or children, the
right was personal and did not descend. The duty under the contract
was discharged because of the impossibility of performance caused by
his death. Or, alternatively, no duty of performance under the contract
ever arose because there was an implied condition of survival.
The possibility of such an analysis suggests that where the right of
the third party beneficiary is not personal, a result contrary to the re-
sult in the Ruchert case might be expected. The confusion evidenced
in the Ruchert case and its many predecessors should warn the drafts-
man to approach a joint and mutual will with great care if not outright
trepidation. The will, future interests, and contract problems should
be differentiated both in study and execution. The execution of the
will and the underlying contract, as separate documents, appears to
be essential to adequate drafting.
DAVID L. WILLIAMS
24 Because the contract to devise was oral it would be unenforceable under the
staute of frauds unless there was something to take the case out of the statute. Allen v.
Dillard, 15 Wn.2d 35, 129 P.2d 813 (1942). Because the language of the joint and
mutual will was donative rather than promissory it does not suffice as a memorandum
of the contract. Nor was the making of a joint and mutual will sufficient part per-
formance to take the contract out of the statute. Ibid. However, the acceptance of an
estate given under the mutual wills was sufficient performance of the contract to take
the case out of the statute. Cummings v. Sherman, 16 Wn.2d 88, 132 P.2d 998 (1943) ;
it re Fischer's Estate, 196 Wash. 41, 81 P.2d 836 (1938). Since the court assumed
an enforceable contract, it did not consider whether the requirement of clear and con-
vincing proof of the contract had been satisfied. See Annot., 169 A.L.R. 9 (1947) for
a general discussion of joint and mutual wills.
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